South African labour affairs are in a volatile state. Conflicting rights and interests as well as the balancing of these rights and interests are contributing to this state of affairs. In recent years, the contentious issues of workers' right to use their economic power to put pressure on employers and employers' recourse to lock-out and replacement labour have come under the spotlight again. Prolonged, violent and unprotected strikes have raised the question whether our industrial relations framework should be revisited, and have complicated matters even further. The question whether employers may use replacement labour and have recourse to lock-outs when an impasse exists during wage negotiations is considered in the context of the adversarial collective bargaining framework in South Africa.
Introduction
The purpose of the Labour Relations Act 1 (LRA) is to advance economic development, social justice, labour peace and democratisation of the workplace. 2 The primary objects of the LRA include the following: "[T]o provide a framework within which employees and their trade unions, employers and employer's organisations can (i) collectively bargain to determine wages, terms and conditions of employment, and other matters of mutual interest; and (ii) formulate industrial policy" 3 and (iii) "to promote orderly collective bargaining [and] collective bargaining at sectoral level". 4 The LRA in its purpose provision also provides for the advancement of the effective resolution of labour disputes. Central to collective bargaining is the right to strike and the recourse to lock-out available to employees and employers respectively. Workers exercise collective power primarily through the mechanism of strike action. On the other hand, employers may exercise power against workers "through a range of weapons, such as dismissal, the employment of alternative or replacement labour, the unilateral implementation of new terms and conditions of employment, and the exclusion of workers from the workplace (the last of these being generally called a 'lock-out')". 5 It has been said that "South Africa faces deep problems of poverty, unemployment and inequality" 6 that these problems have a direct influence on participants in the labour relations environment, and that they shape the issues over which they engage and the manner in which they do so. 7 Thus, the high rate of unemployment in South Africa makes it easy for employers to find a labour source when their employees participate in strike action. 8 In South Africa the right of workers to strike is constitutionally enshrined. Section 23 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (the In essence, collective bargaining is about the balancing of power so that employers and employees are able to utilise their respective labour weapons (that is, the use of replacement labour or recourse to lock-out by the employer and employees' right to strike). The LRA is also concerned with possible power imbalances, as it creates the respective rights and recourses that enable the parties to use their economic powers against each other once the matter in dispute has been unsuccessfully referred to conciliation Previously it was said that the relationship between collective bargaining and industrial action:
… is much like the relationship between diplomacy and war [as] it is the threat of force and the pain which its exercise might inflict on either side which generally induces governments to seek solutions to international problems by negotiation. The threat of superior force also governs the way statesmen move their pieces in the bargaining game. This may entail bluff which, in the final analysis, can only be called by declaring open war. But even after war breaks out, diplomacy continues, unless the more powerful side demands unconditional surrender.
However, it is unwise to push the analogy between warfare and strike action too far. Strikes are not battles fought in a constant war between management and labour; they are merely the means by which employees periodically exert their collective right to withdraw labour, and by which management's liability to do without labour is weighed against the workers' capacity to endure without pay. To equate strike action with warfare may lead to misconceptions, not the least of which is to regard strikes as a justification for drawing other 'weapons' to induce surrender. Strikes may often deteriorate into mob action, which the courts will interdict. Similarly, however, employers are tempted to regard dismissal as their 'ultimate weapon', a tendency corrected by the Supreme The above thoughts notwithstanding, it is difficult to resist comparing strikes and lock-outs with warfare because they both entail the use of collective power to force the other party to do what they do not wish to do. Strikes are calculated to cause harm, not only to the employer, but also to non-striking employees and even customers and suppliers. But strikes are not a licence to cause physical harm. This is why in most common-law jurisdictions courts have been reluctant to acknowledge a right to strike. As been pointed out, no other basic human right exists for the sole purpose of forcing others to do what they do not wish to do. The theoretical basis for such a right is its pivotal role in the exercise of another right -namely, the right to collective bargaining. 13 Collective bargaining has a long history, as is evidenced by the developments in various countries. 14 It has also played an important role in granting workers a "voice" in organisations. Collective bargaining is an adversarial process, which involves negotiation between parties with conflicting interests "seeking to achieve mutually acceptable compromises". 15 For workers it is primarily 16 a means of maintaining "certain standards of distribution of work, of rewards and of stability of employment", while employers view it as a means of maintaining "industrial peace". 17 Since 2007 the adversarial nature of collective bargaining has become increasingly evident due to "a decline in negotiating capacity, the reemergence of non-workplace issues negotiations, and the rise of general mistrust between the parties". 18 These are also the key factors that contribute to the worsening of the collective bargaining process. 19 importance". 21 The data shows that the incidence of strikes declined from 1995 until about 2003, when it began to increase. More worryingly, the data also shows that from 1995 to 2012 there has been an increase in the number of strikes that last for longer than a month. This has led to the conclusion that "we can expect strikes to become longer in the future". 22 Indeed, the 2014 statistics compiled by the Department of Labour showed that there were fewer strikes than in 2013 but that they were longer. 23 It is important to note that 52% of strikes in 2014 were protected while 48% were unprotected. This was the direct opposite of what occurred in 2013 when 52% of strikes were unprotected while 48% were protected. 24 More recently, among the 110 strikes which occurred in 2015, 45% were protected while 55% were not. 25 On the other hand, employers are turning to replacement labour (also known as "scab labour") during industrial actions. On the same day TAWUSA advised the employer that its members would not strike and would report for duty as normal. TAWUSA also advised the employer that any lock-out against its members would be unlawful. Aggrieved by the notice to lock its members out, TAWUSA approached the Labour Court on an urgent basis for an interdict. The Labour Court framed the issue to be determined as follows: The court emphasised the fact that the definition contains the phrases "for the purpose of compelling the employee to accept a demand" and "those employees". To whom does the phrase "those employees" refer? In answering this question, the court held that the phrase refers to employees who have refused to accept a demand made by their employer. Put differently, the court held that a lock-out must be directed at employees with a demand. As the court explained, "logic dictates that one cannot compel somebody who does not resist or one who does not present a counterdemand". 36 In similar vein, the court held that a lock-out must have a purpose; that is to say, when implementing a lock-out the purpose should be to compel those employees to accept a demand. This was so because, as the court reasoned, the exclusion of employees without any purpose is not a lock-out as defined and is bound to be unlawful in terms of the LRA. 37
In addition to the above definition of the term "lock-out", the court also emphasised the fact that section 64 of the LRA -which provides for the right to strike by employees, recourse to lock-out by employers and the procedural requirements for protected strikes or lock-outs -refers to the word "dispute" several times. In the case of a proposed lock-out a notice must be given to a trade union which is a party to the dispute or, if there is
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Putco 1 para 14. PELJ 2017 (20) 8 no trade union, to the employees. 38 Based on this provision, the court held that the trade union which has to be given notice of the intended lock-out is one which is a party to the dispute. If a trade union is not a party to the dispute, so the court reasoned, it ought not to be notified of the proposed lock-out. 39 It is important to note that there was a dispute on the papers on whether or not TAWUSA had said that it would support the strike called by SATAWU and TOWU. The court held that it had not. Also, the court determined that both employers (Putco and Algoa Bus Company) had not made any demand which had been rejected by TAWUSA and which would have constituted a dispute. 40 In applying the law to the above facts, the court held that the LRA does not allow a lock-out to be directed at all employees. 41 Put differently, the court held that an employer faced with a strike by some of its employees may not lawfully lock out all of its employees, including those not on strike. The court granted an interdict against each of the two employers (Putco and Algoa Bus Company) from continuing to lock out TAWUSA's members in their employ. 42
Putco 2: The Labour Appeal Court judgment
Not satisfied with the Labour Court's judgment, Putco appealed against it. Algoa Bus Company did not lodge an appeal against the Labour Court's judgment. The fact that collective bargaining on wages and other conditions of employment in the transport industry took place at the SARPBAC was the key factor in the court's determination of the appeal.
On appeal both sides raised virtually the same arguments as they had in the court aquo: TAWUSA argued that it was not a party to the dispute that had arisen at the SARPBAC, and since it had not declared any dispute with Putco the lock-out against TAWUSA members was unlawful. On the other hand, Putco argued that an employer who was party to a bargaining council should be entitled to lock out employees who are members of a non-party union because the non-party union members have a material interest in the outcome of the dispute. The lock-out, so the argument went, would promote collective bargaining at sectoral level and would give effect to the 38 Section 64(1)(c) of the LRA. (20) 9 majoritarian principle which underlies the collective bargaining dispensation in South Africa.
The court noted the fact that the constitution of the SARPBAC provided that all collective agreements concluded under the auspices of the SARPBAC were binding on all eligible employees in the employ of the employers' organisations and on those parties and or individuals to whom it was extended in terms of section 32 of the LRA. Therefore, the court held that TAWUSA's members had an interest in the negotiations at the SARPBAC (where SATAWU and TOWU had rejected the employer's wage demands) and that the dispute was about a matter of mutual interest to the employer and the employees. 43 Also, the court held that the definition of a lock-out in the LRA does not provide that it should be directed at striking employees only. Therefore, so the court reasoned, an employer may lock out all employees (striking or non-striking) who do not accept the employer's demand. It is important to note that the court held that TAWUSA had expressly rejected the employer's wage demand. 44 The court went on to explain that an employer, as part of its strategy to put pressure on its employees to accept its demands, may decide to lock out all employees in order to achieve an individual or group capitulation. 45 The court further held that since the members of TAWUSA could decide to join the strike at any time without giving notice to the employer, it would be unfair to expect the employer not to implement a lock-out against them whilst they were refusing to accept the employer's demand. 46 In the light of these findings, the court held that Putco had acted lawfully when it locked out the members of TAWUSA. 47 The appeal was upheld and the order of the court a quo was set aside.
Putco 3: The Constitutional Court judgment
Dissatisfied with the Labour Appeal Court's judgment, TAWUSA appealed against it. In a unanimous judgment (per Khampepe J), the Constitutional Court framed the issue before it as follows:
The central question in this case is whether the Labour Relations Act (LRA) permits an employer to exclude from its workplaces, by way of a purported lock-out, members of a trade union that were not a party to a bargaining
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council where a dispute arose and was subsequently referred for conciliation. 48 TAWUSA argued that section 64(1)(c) envisages locking out a party who has an interest in a dispute, or who is directly affected by it. It further contended that section 64(1) does not authorise a lock-out against a trade union and its members who are not party to the dispute that has given rise to the lock-out. It emphasised that a lock-out is defined as the exclusion from the workplace by an employer of its employees for the purpose of compelling these employees to accept a demand. Consequently, so the argument went, there can be no dispute if there is no demand. On the facts of the case, it argued that there could not have been a demand made to it as it was not a member of the bargaining council where the dispute arose.
On the other hand, Putco argued that section 64(1) of the LRA provides that notice to a bargaining council is deemed as notice to all unions operating within its jurisdiction; therefore TAWUSA was effectively a party to the dispute.
The court reiterated the definition of the term "lock-out" as defined in section 213 of the LRA. 49 It noted that the purpose of a lock-out in terms of section 213 is to compel employees whose trade union is party to certain negotiations to accede to an employer's demand. 50 Accordingly, the court held that, as a matter of logic, there must be a dispute between an employer and employees or their trade union before a lock-out is implemented. 51 Therefore, "any exclusion of employees from an employer's workplace that is not preceded by a demand in respect of a disputed matter of mutual interest does not qualify as a lockout in terms of section 213 of the LRA". 52
Was there, in the present matter, a demand made by Putco to TAWUSA or its members? It should be noted that in oral argument it was contended on Putco's behalf that the lock-out notice given to TAWUSA constituted a demand. The court rejected this argument and held that the lock-out notice could not constitute a demand. This was so because a lock-out notice cannot constitute both a notice and a demand at the same time. The court explained as follows:
A lock-out notice cannot constitute both a notice and a demand at the same time. The LRA clearly distinguishes between a notice and a demand and does not use the two interchangeably. The purpose of a lock-out notice is to inform
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PER / PELJ 2017 (20) 11 a union and its members of an impending lock-out. In other words, recourse to a lawful lock-out must already be available. An employer is not entitled to resort to a lock-out if it has not yet made a demand to those employees who are to be excluded from the employer's workplaces. 53 Furthermore, the court held that since TAWUSA was not a member of the Bargaining Council, no demand had been made to TAWUSA nor had it been in a position to accede to the demands Putco had made to the trade unions (SATAWU and TOWU) that were present at the Bargaining Council. 54 In the light of the above findings, the court ultimately held that the purported lockout of TAWUSA's members did not comply with the definition of a lock-out as defined in section 213 of the LRA. 55 Apart from non-compliance with the definition of a lock-out, the court also held that the purported lock-out did not comply with the provisions of section 64 of the LRA. The court held that the referral process (for conciliation) mandated by the LRA had not taken place. It reasoned that even though conciliation had taken place at the Bargaining Council and had been unsuccessful, this process had not involved TAWUSA because it had not been a party to the Bargaining Council. 56 The appeal was upheld and the order of the court a quo set aside.
Evaluation
From the above, it is evident that both the Labour Court in Putco 1 and the Constitutional Court in Putco 3 ruled in favour of the trade union TAWUSA, whilst the Labour Appeal Court in Putco2 ruled in favour of the employer Putco.
Regarding Putco 1, the first thing that is apparent is the manner in which the court framed the issue to be determined by it, namely:
Crisply put, the question is whether an employer faced with a strike called by one or two unions can lawfully lockout all its employees inclusive of those not on strike, having not been called to strike by the union they belong to. 57
By framing the issue in this manner, the court was basically asking whether the LRA allows secondary lock-outs. It is submitted that in the light of the facts of the Putco matter, the manner in which the issue to be determined was framed by the court in Putco 3 was more appropriate:
The central question in this case is whether the Labour Relations Act (LRA) permits an employer to exclude from its workplaces, by way of a purported lock-out, members of a trade union that were not a party to a bargaining council where a dispute arose and was subsequently referred for conciliation. 60 Be that as it may, the court in Putco 1 was indeed correct in focusing on section 213 (which defines the term lock-out) and section 64 (which lays down the procedural requirements for protected lock-outs) of the LRA. The LRA protects the right of every employee to strike and all employers' recourse to lock-out. 61 However, strikes and lock-outs "are not absolute and must be exercised within the legal framework before such industrial actions are protected by law". 62 This is provided for by the LRA. 63 In terms of the LRA, a protected lock-out is one which complies with the provisions of chapter four of the LRA. 64 In Putco 1, as was also the case in Putco 2 and 3, the court correctly held that a lock-out as defined by the LRA must be accompanied by a demand. 65 The definition of the term lock-out in the LRA makes it abundantly clear that 60
61
In terms of s 64(1) of the LRA, which in part provides that "[e]very employee has the right to strike and every employer has recourse to lock-out..." S 64 should be read with s 65, which deals with limitations on the right to strike and recourse to lock-out. the purpose of a lock-out is to compel employees or their trade unions to accede to an employer's demand. 66 A demand must encompass more than simply requiring employees to perform their obligations in terms of their contracts of employment. 67 A lock-out must always be accompanied by an express demand: for a demand to exist the locked out employees must be informed of the actions expected of them for the lock-out to be lifted. 68 The Constitutional Court in Putco 3 affirmed that "the LRA requires an employer to make a perspicuous demand to employees before resorting to locking them out". 69
In Putco 1 the court noted that it was loath to entertain a debate regarding whether or not the lock-out in question was a defensive or offensive one. However, as is shown below, the question of whether or not a lock-out is defensive or offensive is a key consideration in determining whether an employer may use replacement labour during a strike by its employees.
3 The Sun International case
The facts
The trade union SACCAWU (South African Commercial, Catering and Allied Workers' Union) embarked on a protected strike of limited duration and issued a notice in terms of section 64 of the LRA on 21 September 2015.
The notice informed Sun International (the employer) that the strike would start on 25 September 2015. The dispute involved demands for wage increases, minimum working hours and a housing subsidy.
On 22 September 2015, three days before the strike was set to commence, the employer issued a notice, the heading of which read as follows: "Notification of the commencement of a lockout in terms of section 64(1)(c) read with section 76(1)(b) Labour Relations Act, 66 of 1995, as amended (the LRA)". The lock-out was set to commence on 25 September 2015.
Feeling aggrieved by the said notice, SACCAWU approached the Labour Court on an urgent basis where it sought a declaratory and interdictory order in the following terms:
Declaring that the Respondent's unlimited duration lock-out is not meant to counteract the effect of the strike action by the Applicant's members and is, 
The judgment
The court identified the issue to be determined as whether in terms of section 76(1)(b) of the LRA an employer may continue to use replacement labour after a strike has ended. 71 For convenience, it should be noted that section 76 of the LRA is titled "Replacement labour" and provides that:
(1) An employer may not take into employment any person-(a) to continue or maintain production during a protected strike if the whole or a part of the employer's service has been designated a maintenance service; or (b) for the purpose of performing the work of any employee who is locked out, unless the lock-out is in response to a strike.
(2) For the purpose of this section, 'take into employment' includes engaging the services of a temporary employment service or an independent contractor.
Although the trade union conceded that the lock-out in question was protected, it argued that an employer's right to use replacement labour must be in response to a strike and that once a strike has ended, section 76(1)(b) of the LRA no longer applies. On the other hand, the employer argued that, taking into account the interpretation clause contained in the LRA, it is entitled to use replacement labour in a context in which the employer reacts to a strike by means of a protected lock-out, even after the end of such strike. It would be anomalous, so the argument went, that an employer is entitled to meet a union's attack by way of a counter-attack (in the form of a lock-out), but with its right to an effective counter-attack being limited by a factor of the attacker's choice -the duration of the hostilities. In the light of the above conflicting judgments, the court had to decide whether or not to follow Ntimane. For the reasons outlined below and discussed in more detail later, the court decided not to follow Ntimane. The court considered the meaning of the words "in response to a strike" in section 76 (1) 
Evaluation
In order to understand why section 76 of the LRA is drafted in the way it is, it is perhaps helpful to start by providing some historical context. 79 The early 1990s were marked by major political and legal changes in South Africa. For example, President De Klerk announced the unbanning of several organisations including the African National Congress (ANC), the release of political prisoners (including Nelson Mandela) and the repeal of apartheid legislation. 80 The negotiations between the government and the ANC which began in 1991 eventually led to an agreement on an interim constitution 81 emphasis was placed on labour rights in the new dispensation. 83 The following labour rights were entrenched in the Interim Constitution: the right to fair labour practices; the right to form and join trade unions; the right to organise and bargain collectively; and the right to strike. 84 Significantly, an employer's recourse to lock-out for the purpose of collective bargaining was also protected in the Interim Constitution. 85 Within a short time of assuming power, the new, democratically elected ANC-led government announced its intention to introduce a new labour relations statute. 86 There was a need to bring the Labour Relations Act into line with the Interim Constitution. 87 The Interim Constitution was therefore one of the main incentives for reforming the Labour Relations Act. 88 A commission was appointed to produce a draft Labour Relations Bill. The draft produced by the commission formed the basis of the current LRA. 89
One of the major defects of the 1956 LRA was its failure to provide striking employees with any protection against dismissal. 90 The other defects of the 1956 LRA with respect to strike law included complicated and technical prestrike procedures, onerous ballot provisions, the criminalisation of strikes and lock-outs, the prohibition of socio-economic strikes and the ready availability of interdicts and damages claims. 91 of key points. 95 The use of replacement labour during protected strike action was one of the "key points of contention" during consultation on the proposed Draft Bill. 96 Business South Africa wanted strikes and lock-outs to be allowed once the correct procedure (including a strike ballot) had been followed. It also submitted that employers should retain their right to replace striking workers. 97 On the other hand, trade unions were adamant that replacement labour or scab labour should not be allowed during a procedural strike. 98 One of the issues which the drafters of the Draft Bill considered was the effect of a protected strike on an employer. Keeping in mind the extensive protection afforded to employees who participate in protected strike action by the Draft Bill, they reasoned that "it is through the resolution of the dispute or continued production, with the use of an alternative workforce, that the company's viability can best be maintained". 99 Therefore, the Draft Bill offered an employer facing bankruptcy three options: resolve the dispute, employ temporary replacement labour or dismiss the striking workers on grounds of operational requirements. 100
Negotiations on the Draft Bill were concluded on 21 July 1995. Although business and labour had reached consensus on a number of key points of contention, they had failed to reach consensus on the use of replacement labour. 101 The rationale behind s 76 (1)(b) is that if an employer decides to institute a lock-out as the aggressor in the fight between itself and employees or a union, it may not employ temporary replacement labour. That is to discourage the resort by employers to lock-outs. The rationale is to try and let employers resort to lock-outs only in those circumstances where they will be prepared to do without replacement labour (i.e. when they are the aggressors) or where they are forced to in self-defence in the sense that the lock-out is 'in response to' a strike by the union and the employees -in other words, where the union and the employees are the aggressors. 108
Returning to the Sun International matter, it is obvious that this case turned on the interpretation of the words "in response to a strike" as used in section 76(1)(b) of the LRA. Do these words mean that the right to employ replacement labour accrues at the stage when a defensive lock-out is implemented and endures until the lock-out ceases, as was held in Ntimane? Or do they mean that the statutory right of an employer to use replacement labour is restricted to the period during which a protected strike continues and not after it has ceased, as was held in Sun International?
The facts of both cases are strikingly similar. In Ntimane there was a dispute between the trade union SACCAWU and the employer regarding wage negotiations. The employees engaged in a protected strike and the employer responded by instituting a lock-out. The lock-out was in response to the strike. The trade union informed the employer that it did not accept the employer's demands but was calling off the strike. In turn, the employer informed the trade union that the lock-out would continue until such time as its offer had been accepted by the union's members.
The starting point in determining the true meaning of the words "in response to a strike" as used in section 76 (1) Section 3 sanctions a purposive model of statutory interpretation as opposed to a literal approach. 111 The objects of the Act are not simply textual aids. They "must inform the interpretative process from its inception". 112 In other words, the Act must be read in the light of its objects. 113 As was noted earlier, section 23 of the Constitution specifically deals with labour relations. Therefore, the LRA must be interpreted in the light of the Constitution, especially section 23 thereof. Put differently, the interpretation clause of the LRA emphasises that the Act must be interpreted to give effect to the constitutional rights. 114
In Sun International, the court emphasised the interpretation clause and the fact that "the constitutionally protected right to strike is not equivalent to the statutory right to lock-out as provided by the LRA". 115 Indeed, it is correct that South African law does not treat strikes and lock-outs as equal "weapons". 116 Unlike the Interim Constitution, 117 the (final) Constitution of South Africa protects the right to strike but excludes the right to lock-out. In addressing this issue directly, the Constitutional Court in the Certification case rejected the argument that "it is necessary in order to maintain equality to entrench the right to lock out once the right to strike has been included". 118
According to Creamer, this approach -the Constitution's protection of the right to strike and its silence on the lock-out -heralds a new approach to the regulation of industrial action in South Africa, based on the "'asymmetrical parity' conception". 119 Keeping in mind this asymmetrical parity conception, the court in Sun International held that the statutory right of an employer to use replacement labour is restricted to the period during which a protected strike continues and not after it has ended. 120 Moreover, See s 27(5) of the Interim Constitution, which provided that "Employers' recourse to lock-out for the purpose of collective bargaining shall not be impaired, subject to section 33(1)".
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Creamer 1998 ILJ 17. the court cited the ILO's Committee of Experts 121 where the latter had stated that workers who participate in a lawful strike should be able to return to work once the strike has ended. 122
It seems to be common cause that the lock-out in Sun International, which was implemented by the employer on 25 September 2015, was in response to a strike by its employees, which commenced on the same day. 123 Also, it seems that it was common cause that the termination of the said strike did not affect the legality of the lock-out: it remained a protected lock-out and the employer was not required to comply anew with the procedural requirements set out in section 64 of the LRA. 124 Put differently, the lock-out (even after the strike had been terminated) was the unbroken continuation of the action which the employer had embarked upon on 25 September 2015. 125 As the court put it in Ntimane, "a chameleon remains a chameleon even after it has changed its hue". 126
It is important to emphasise that in Sun International the workers called off their strike without accepting the employer's final offer -there was an ongoing dispute and the employer was therefore entitled to continue with the lock-out. 127 Under these circumstances, given the court's reliance on the ILO's Committee of Experts, where the latter had stated that workers who participate in a lawful strike should be able to return to work once the strike has ended, were the employees in Sun International able to return to work once they had terminated their strike? It is submitted that they were not entitled to do so whilst the lock-out was in place.
If one were to follow the reasoning of the court in Sun International it would mean that the employer's lock-out remained the same protected lock-out for the purposes of section 64 of the LRA but at the same time changed (when the employees terminated their strike) into an offensive lock-out for the purposes of section 76(1)(b) of the LRA -which meant that the employer was no longer allowed to employ replacement labour. This cannot be correct
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In part, the lock-out notice provided that "the lockout will continue until such time as Sun International's aforesaid offer has been accepted..." since the employer instituted only one lock-out, in response to the strike by its employees.
Moreover, section 76(1)(b) of the LRA does not provide that the exception therein is rendered inapplicable when the strike in response to which the lock-out was initiated terminates. 128 In Sun International the court applied purposive interpretation to reach the conclusion that the statutory right of an employer to use replacement labour is restricted to the period during which a protected strike continues and falls away after it has ceased. Although the LRA endorses purposive statutory interpretation, purposive interpretation is no license to ignore the clear language used in the Act. The above case is a good example of an instance where a trade union, relying on purposive interpretation, sought to convince the court to interpret narrowly an employer's right to employ temporary replacement labour in terms of section 76(1)(b) of the LRA. In this case, the trade union argued that the phrase "in response to a strike" in section 76(1)(b) of the LRA should be interpreted as referring to unprotected strikes only. The Labour Appeal Court, correctly it is submitted, rejected this argument. 131 In SACTWU v Coats 132 the court said the following about purposive interpretation:
The purposive approach is applied in order to give effect to the purpose or ratio of a statute. If the purpose of the statute is evident from the language used, the words used must be given their ordinary meaning. The purposive approach is not a licence to ignore the plain meaning of the language. seeks to attach to the words 'take into employment' then it could simply have used the word 'employ' instead of 'take into employment '. 133 In the light of the above, it is submitted that the court in Ntimane was correct in its interpretation of section 76(1)(b) of the LRA. Grogan states that "if a lock-out commences as a 'defensive' lock-out (i.e. in response to a strike) and the workers subsequently abandon their strike, the right to employ replacement labour continues". 134 Furthermore, we also agree with the court in Ntimane that the employer's right to continue using replacement labour is counterbalanced by the right to picket. 135 Section 69 of the LRA affords members of a trade union the right to picket in support of a protected strike or in opposition to any lock-out. The right to picket is reinforced by the fundamental rights to freedom of expression 136 and freedom of assembly 137 as guaranteed by the Constitution. 138 The position of the LRA is in line with that of the ILO. According to the ILO, taking part in picketing and firmly but peacefully inciting other workers to keep away from their workplace cannot be considered unlawful. 139 It is submitted that the "other workers" referred to by the ILO include replacement workers. Importantly, in the South African context, there is a Code of Good Practice on Picketing. 140 Item 3 thereof provides that:
The purpose of the picket is to peacefully encourage non-striking employees and members of the public to oppose a lock-out or to support strikers involved in a protected strike. 143 Consequently, this sort of (bad faith) bargaining may increase both the probability and the length of a strike. 144 It is important for trade unions to properly understand the implications of their actions before acting on behalf of their members. They need to be aware of the fact that when they initiate industrial action in the form of a strike there are certain legal consequences which are favourable and not so favourable to their members. On the favourable side, for example, is the protection against dismissal. It has been described as "the most meaningful protection for strikes that comply with the Act" 145 and "the most valuable protection offered to employees". 146 On the not so favourable side, for example, is the risk of being dismissed for operational requirements. Also, and more relevant, is the fact that employers have the right to replace striking workers -with or without a lock-out. The policy [rationale behind section 76(1)(b) of the LRA] is one that also says to unions and employees: Do not lightly resort to a strike when a dispute has arisen because, in the absence of a strike, the employer may not employ replacement labour even if it institutes a lock-out but, if you strike, the employer will be able to employ replacement labour -with or without a lockout. The sum total of all this is that the policy is to encourage parties to disputes to try to reach agreement on their disputes and a strike or lock-out should be the last resort when all reasonable attempts to reach agreement have failed. 147 On a broader note, the Sun International matter exposes some of the controversial aspects of replacement labour. It has been argued that allowing the use of replacement labour is one of the factors that have tilted the balance of power in favour of employers in relation to collective bargaining, and that the use of replacement labour during strikes may affect the effectiveness of a strike and thus prolong it. 148 The Department of Labour has identified the use of replacement labour as one of the key reasons behind the increasing length of strikes in South Africa. 149 The persuasive force of a strike largely depends upon the extent to which striking workers are able to interrupt the employer's business or production by withdrawing their labour. 150 The ILO regards the right to strike as constituting a fundamental right of workers and as an essential aspect of trade union rights, 151 and the Committee on Freedom of Association has always recognised the right to strike by workers and their organisations "as a legitimate means of defending their economic and social interests". 152 Employers want to be able to employ persons to maintain production during a strike or lock-out. However, from the employees' point of view the use of replacement labour deprives them of the only "weapon" that they have, namely, the ability to withhold their labour and thereby place economic pressure on the employer. 153 It therefore prima facie seems odd to entrench the right of workers to strike whilst at the same time allowing the employer to simply replace them when they exercise that right.
Violence during strikes has become a serious concern in South Africa. 154 Instead of being characterised by orderly picket lines, South Africa has "one of the highest rates of industrial action, with its strikes amongst the most violent in the world". 155 It has been said that the use of replacement labour increases the potential for conflict and violence. 156 According to Tenza, 157 it "has turned out to be the root cause of violent strikes". Strike violence usually breaks out when the employer attempts to continue operating during the strike. 158 Workers who assist the employer to maintain production during a strike and so undermine the effect of the strike are also colloquially referred to as "scabs". 159 There have been numerous instances where people who were scabs or were considered to be scabs were either Although trade unions have argued for a total ban on replacement labour in South Africa, 161 they have not been successful thus far. The drafters of the LRA viewed the use of replacement labour from the perspective of both employees and employer. Jordaan 162 argues that a total ban on replacement labour would mean that the employer was denied the right to do business. He submits that a substantial case based on public policy would have to be made out why this should be the case. For him, the mere fact that replacement labour may reduce the effectiveness of a strike is simply insufficient. 163 The Putco and Sun International cases highlight some of the defensive industrial weapons that are available to an employer when faced with a strike. In the Putco matter the Constitutional Court as the highest court in the country spoke in a unanimous judgment. This case will now serve as a clear reminder to all employers that a lock-out must be preceded by a demand to the employees who are to be excluded from the workplace. As was noted earlier, it is important to emphasise that in Sun International the workers called off their strike without accepting the employer's final offerthere was an ongoing dispute and the employer was therefore entitled to continue with the lock-out. 164 Regarding the proper interpretation of section 76(1)(b) and the use of replacement labour, it is only the Constitutional Court that can provide a definitive interpretation of the phrase "in response to a strike". The conflicting judgments of the Labour Court in Ntimane and Sun International will most likely lead to a lot of unnecessary confusion. Therefore, it is important that this issue be settled sooner rather than later. 
